Political networks in the European Parliament Network analysis of the 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
ATTILA KOVÁCS
EU-level decision-making has already been analysed from a number of point of views. Nevertheless, social network analysis in the context of the EU’s legislative procedures, particularly in the European Parliament is still limited. The objective of this paper is to analyse the relationships of the Members of the European Parliament during the elaboration of the legislative instruments of the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy reform. Interpersonal networks of EP members have been transformed into networks of EP groups as well as EU Member States. The novelty of this research is the combination of network analysis with the analysis of the legislative amendments of the EP. The results of the analysis show that EU-15 as well as net contributor Member States are more active and cluster together more frequently in the network. Also, Member States with higher economic dependency act together more frequently in the legislative process. Regarding the EP Groups, the most active one is the European People’s Party, while the European Conservatives and Reformists Group play the most important role as intermediary in the network.
Enforcement of Competition Policy in the EU Energy Sector
PÉTER VINCE
Three EU directives regulating the internal energy market of the European Union have created the conditions for opening up the market in the energy sector. However, corporate behaviour distorting competition as well as member states’ acts of intervention in the market have hindered in the realisation of opening markets and liberalization. In order to ensure that market liberalization is implemented in accordance with the directives, the European Commission has applied competition policy measures and sought to eliminate specific anti-competitive positions through proceedings and rulings. Prior EU proceedings initiated for the enforcement of competition have been dominated by cases directly affecting the competitive position of companies and concerned the conduct of those companies, their relative market powers and state aid. Exposing distortions to market competition have in recent years been complemented by new considerations – of environmental and climate protection – that do not concern companies’ competitive positions. However, in EU procedures aimed at enforcing competition in the energy sector, adoption of these criteria must be harmonised with the requirement to strengthen the single internal market.
Scientific cooperation between the European Union and Turkey Advantages and possible synergies
ÁGOTA DÁVID – TAMÁS SZIGETVÁRI
The Turkish economy has shown remarkable economic performance over the last decade. Currently, it is the 18th largest economy in the world. To increase its competitiveness, Turkey set research and development as a priority area for the next decade, with the ambitious goal of reaching 3% of GERD/GDP by 2023. Despite several controversies about the EU accession process in general, Turkey is an active member of the European research area. It is an associated member of the RDI Framework Programs since 2002, it participated in and coordinated various scientific projects, policy-coordination actions, mobility programs and won grants for excellent researchers. In the Turkish national STI strategy for 2011-2016, the three vertical and six horizontal axes consist of various scientific areas like ICT, Energy, Defence, Water, Food, which have been also set as priority areas in the European H2020 program. We would like to focus in our article on possible synergies between priority areas, as well as on the role of SMEs in the innovation chain, which are enjoying a special attention in both Horizon 2020 and in Turkish national science and economic policy.
Budget support in fragile states: anomaly or paradox?
JULIANNA PONTET – BEÁTA UDVARI
In our previous study (Udvari-Pontet, 2015) we analyzed budget support highlighting the fact that many donors expect the increase of aid effectiveness thanks to this aid modality. However, the use of budget support may associate with high risks especially in recipient countries where good governance, political stability are problematic and the level of corruption is high. Though, many donors – including the European Union – emphasize the relevance of budget support in fragile states where the criteria mentioned above are partially or completely missing. This caveat raises the questions how budget support can be successful in recipient countries which do not meet the minimum conditions of budget support, and what reasons may motivate donors to provide this aid modality. The aim of this study is to analyze the appearance of budget support in fragile states with statistical tools. Based on the results it can be stated that economic and social development and institutional conditions of fragile states do not effect on the volume of budget support in these countries, so it seems that the economic and strategic interests of donors are more decisive.
Legal supplement
Protection of Public and Private Interest in Rome I Regulation –
some Observation about the Interpretation of Overriding Mandatory Rules
KATALIN RAFFAI
Judgment of the Court in Case C‑463/13 Stanley International Betting Ltd, Stanleybet Malta Ltd
GÁBOR KOÓS
This presentation of some relevant judgments of the ECJ shows how Italy had to transform its regulation concerning gambling and how it has established a much more open model based upon concessions instead of the former monopolistic structure conflicting with EU Law. It is worth to highlight the interaction and demonstrate how the Italian regulation has been modified stimulated by the judgments of the ECJ and how the Court has reacted on these developments. As the result of this conti- nuously ongoing process it becomes obvious, how these judgments of the ECJ have contributed to the transformation from a monopolistic structure to a system based upon concessions. The analyzed judgment of the Court is the most recent element of this progress, the main subject of which is the limitation of the duration of the concession.